A DOE, Oh Dear, Cobalt’s Mining Is Unclear: The Heart Of The Democratic Republic Of The Congo
I. Introduction to Cobalt’s Wealth and Woe
The Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC) holds the world’s largest cobalt reserves, producing an astounding 144,936 tons in 2022—73% of the global supply.[1] A cornerstone of modern technology, cobalt is a critical component of lithium-ion batteries, powering cellphones, laptops, electric vehicles, and other devices integral to renewable energy.[2] Its magnetic properties also support data storage, wind turbines, and medical equipment,[3] making it a strategic political, economic, and technological priority for the U.S., EU, China, and beyond.[4] Yet, the DRC’s immense underground wealth—estimated at over $24 trillion—has not translated to prosperity above ground geopolitical imperial power and ambitions, economic inequality, and the devastating realities of artisanal.[5]
This analysis anchors an innovative approach to proactive reform by dissecting critical facets of cobalt mining in the DRC—breaking down the mining, consumer perception, Doe v. Apple’s influence, and bold solutions. It breaks down pro-active reform on Apple’s conflict mineral report from 2022, which states how “Apple’s … Commitment to Human Rights … governs how we treat everyone, including our customers, employees, business partners, and people at every level of our supply chain. We continue to source … minerals, such as cobalt … responsibly, while working to improve conditions in and around mining communities, including in the … DRC and adjoining countries.”
II. The Dark Shadow of Technology: Cobalt Miners Echoes from the Ground
Dubbed the “blood diamond of batteries,” cobalt drives an industry where an estimated 40,000 children labor in hazardous conditions, akin to debt bondage.[6] These miners face severe physical, mental, and emotional hazards, including exposure to toxic chemicals.[7] Despite its negative association, cobalt is not classified as a conflict mineral under U.S. law, unlike gold, tin, and tungsten’s regulation by the Dodd-Frank Act.[8] This oversight allows cobalt’s ethical violations to persist unchecked, as its extraction, while not tied directly to armed conflict, fuels systemic injustices.[9]
As it casts a long and toxic shadow over the DRC, advocates for reform, including Siddharth Kara in his book Cobalt Red, argue for reclassifying cobalt as a conflict mineral, calling for stricter traceability, accountability, and safety standards.[10] Yet, the discrepancy between industrial and artisanal mining remains blurred, leaving artisanal miners exposed to unregulated exploitation.[11] These miners, armed with little more than primitive tools, face dire conditions,[12] earning as little as $2.15 a day.[13] Women bear the dual, metaphorical and literal weight of grueling labor and family care,[14] while their children join the mines out of financial necessity, forfeiting education and well-being for survival.[15]
The risks in the cobalt supply chain are devastating.[16] Workers endure tunnel collapses, toxic dust exposure, and a lack of protective gear, with chronic injuries, lung disease, and paralysis.[17] Efforts like those by the Congregation of Our Lady of Charity of the Good Shepherd in Kolwezi offer glimpses of hope through education and meals, but the systemic challenges remain confounding.[18]
Beyond economic and humanitarian crises, the cobalt industry further pollutes the environment and endangers public health.[19] Communities commonly face carcinogenic exposure, birth defects, asthma, and “hard metal lung disease,”[20] alongside epidemics of cholera and measles.[21] Floods further devastate medical infrastructure,[22] while contaminated water and air turn once-livable regions into hazardous zones.[23] Gender-based violence and mental health crises deepen the suffering, leaving millions trapped in an unforgiving cycle of emergencies.[24]
The DRC’s political landscape is a volatile mix of corruption and instability, with only one peaceful power transfer in its 63 years of independence.[25] Electoral violence,[26] voter registration flaws, and distrust in the Independent National Electoral Commission deepen public skepticism.[27] Consequently, artisanal mining, restricted to ZEAs under SAESSCAM’s oversight, remains chaotic as regulatory gaps leave non-official zones rife with safety violations and exploitation.[28] Further, economic desperation drives the dysfunction: inflation soars past 20%, over 60% of the population lives in poverty, and officials exploit citizens through extortion for cobalt access and transport.[29] Corruption contaminates every level of control,[30] from selective enforcement of anti-corruption laws to nepotism and bribery in public services and the extractive sector, eroding institutional trust.[31] While the legal framework for reform exists, it’s crippled by political manipulation and systemic patronage.[32]
DRC President Tshisekedi’s tenure has been marred by unfulfilled promises of peace and anti-corruption.[33] With over 120 armed groups, including M23 and ISIS-linked ADF, the region has been destabilized for nearly three decades.[34] Even the state-sponsored FARDC, tasked with combating these threats, faces allegations of sexual assault, torture, and extrajudicial killings, further eroding reliance.[35]
Violence tied to mining operations compounds the crisis.[36] Military personnel linked to the Mutoshi project, run by Chemaf, reportedly burned homes in Mukumbi, displacing families and injuring children.[37] Farmers near the Metalkol RTR project, managed by an ERG subsidiary, have suffered devastating land losses.[38] These inter-communal conflicts fuel hate speech and impunity, stripping Congolese citizens of fundamental rights and forcing them into survival mode under dire conditions and, as noted above, without a helpful government to rely on.[39]
a. History of the DRC as a Focal Point for Cobalt Mining
Historically, the story of the DRC is one of exploitation and lost opportunity.[40] Following the First and Second Congo Wars, cobalt production rose from a modest 800 tons in 1994 to 14,800 tons by 2003, propelled by artisanal mining, multinational investments, and influential figures like George Forrest, John Bredenkamp, and Billy Rautenbach—who all have ties to the DRC armed forces.[41] A seismic shift occurred in 2005 when China’s industrial appetite drove massive cobalt purchases and the establishment of processing facilities, catapulting production to 27,100 tons by 2006.[42] In the years that followed, the Congolese government drastically expanded mining activities.[43]
As the world grappled with COVID-19 in 2020, cobalt miners in the DRC faced a ruthless choice—endure oppressive conditions, international labor violations, unsanitary housing, and relentless viral threats, or lose their livelihoods entirely.[44] Responding boldly, the Congolese government initiated sweeping renegotiations and regulatory reforms, reclaiming authority over its mineral riches.[45] While this worried Western investors, this pivot created a power shift, with China swiftly taking advantage and consolidating dominance in the cobalt market, reshaping the industry’s global hierarchy.[46]
Whereas the U.S was once a leader in cobalt control, the U.S. conceded, slashing its strategic raw materials stockpile from $22 billion in 1989 to a mere $888 million in 2022.[47] This laissez-faire approach has left U.S. industries increasingly dependent on Chinese cobalt, despite domestic efforts to promote eco-friendly mining and recycling.[48] Meanwhile, China has aggressively filled the void, dominating cobalt refining—crucial for energy and military tech.[49]
China’s strategy mirrors its broader African playbook: foreign direct investment skyrocketed from $75 million in 2003 to $4.2 billion in 2020, with trade ballooning from $10 billion in 2000 to $25 billion in 2021, weightily balanced on cobalt extraction.[50] While African nations, like the DRC, challenge China’s exploitative practices and unmet promises of ethical mining or infrastructure development, deals persist.[51] For instance, Chinese giants like Sinohydro Corp and China Railway Group have upped commitments to $7 billion in infrastructure projects, solidifying China’s foothold.[52] Additionally, Chinese-owned mines in the DRC employ over half the workforce under an infamous colonial-era cruelty.[53] As highlighted in the Congressional Executive Commission on China, sustainable mining and human rights protections are urgently needed.[54] Diverse collaborations are already shown by investments from countries including Australia, Japan, the United States, and Britain.[55]
With cobalt prices falling due to a surplus of it[56] and the EV industry’s pivot to lithium iron phosphate (LFP) batteries, now is the moment to break dependence on China-controlled mines,[57] like Australia’s $676 million investment in mineral processing.[58] For Apple, this is a rare chance to redefine leadership—turning resource challenges into catalysts for innovation and integrity.
III. The Crusade for Consumer and Corporate Conscience in Cobalt
Consumer awareness plays a pivotal role in the global struggle for control over critical resources like cobalt.[59] An informed, anti-exploitative consumer base can encourage businesses to adopt ethical sourcing and transparency, reshaping market dynamics[60] and driving a shift in purchasing habits that diversify supply chains.[61] Public figures like Ben Affleck and Kyrie Irving have amplified these demands, leveraging their platforms to spotlight corporate responsibility.[62] Similarly, cultural dialogues—spurred by podcasts from Joe Rogan[63] and Dua Lipa—encourage creative solutions and widespread dissemination.[64] However, the path to change is fraught with challenges.[65]
Ethical consumerism often raises costs, diminishing eagerness for advocacy.[66] China’s dominance in cobalt, unconstrained by democratic norms, stems from U.S. hesitation to procurement,[67] trapping their technological and renewable energy sectors in a labyrinth that puts them at a comparative disadvantage.[68] As Judge Nichols aptly described, this “chain of contingencies” underscores the intensifying legal battles shaping the future of corporate responsibility.[69]
IV. Doe’s Decree: A Complicated Congolese Canvas
The DRC plays a pivotal role as a key supplier in the global tech economy, particularly with American-based giants like Apple, Dell, Alphabet (Google), Microsoft, and Tesla’s procurement of cobalt.[70] Scrutiny over ethical procurement is not new but deeply entrenched.[71] As far back as 2009, the U.S. Department of Labor flagged cobalt production’s reliance on child labor, a systemic issue reaffirmed in subsequent reports.[72] By 2016, investigations uncovered exploitation within the industry by leaders Apple, Samsung, Microsoft, Daimler AG, and Volkswagen.[73]
Doe v. Apple stands as a stark reminder of the human cost underpinning our digital age.[74] Filed in December 2019 under the Trafficking Victims Protection Reauthorization Act (TVPRA), the lawsuit, originating in Washington, D.C., aimed to hold tech giants accountable for the corruption, violence, and legal voids embedded in their supply chains.[75] By invoking extraterritorial jurisdiction through the TVPRA, plaintiffs leveraged the defendants’ commercial presence.[76]However, the lawsuit was dismissed in November 2021, on the grounds of forum non conveniens and its speculative nature, raising concerns about corporate responsibility.[77]
Understanding the statutory framework behind this case is pivotal in navigating liability standards, especially when global giants like Apple are implicated. The TVPRA, enacted in 2000 and significantly amended in 2013, expanded both its reach and remedies.[78] Key amendments under 18 U.S.C. §1595 extended the statute of limitations to 10 years, while 18 U.S.C. §1596 extended extraterritorial jurisdiction over offenses outlined in Chapter 77—ranging from peonage (§1581) and forced labor (§1589) to trafficking (§1590) and child sex trafficking (§1591).[79] Crucially, it imposes liability on any individual or entity that “knowingly benefits, financially or by receiving anything of value from participation in a venture” involved in such violations.[80] This impaired the plaintiff’s claim in Doe: the crux of their argument focused on §1589 and §1590.[81] Nonetheless, there are still several legal obstacles to establishing standing and obtaining court remedies:
Extraterritorial Application of Law: In the wake of the Supreme Court’s Kiobel ruling, the Alien Tort Statute’s[82] extraterritorial application has been sharply restricted,[83] shifting the onus of demonstrating that the claims “touch and concern”[84] the related territory to the plaintiffs “with sufficient force” to displace the presumption against extraterritoriality; later decisions have reiterated that “mere corporate presence” and other generalized domestic corporate activity will not suffice.[85]
Forum Non Conveniens: By allowing a court to dismiss cases that may be better heard in other jurisdictions, cases shift to where harm occurred, but justice is often abandoned in the process.[86] This forces foreign nationals, such as cobalt mining victims in the DRC, to rely on their broken home system.[87]
Personal Jurisdiction and Limited Liability: According to the Daimler AG v. Bauman ruling, which further restricts the ability of courts to claim jurisdiction over international organizations, corporate arrangements and limited liability sometimes shield parent firms from being held responsible for the deeds of their subsidiaries.[88]
Vicarious Liability and Legal Standards: The absence of a unified international legal standard for vicarious liability, and the lack of a fully settled American standard for corporate accountability in transnational human-rights aiding-and-abetting claims, creates a murky landscape in determining corporate accountability for human rights abuses, particularly in instances of aiding and abetting.[89] With layers of intermediaries obscuring the mineral’s origin, accurately tracing its path from mine to market becomes a near-impossible mission, leaving companies swaying between unwitting complicity and willful exploitation.[90]
Choice/Conflict of Law and Statutes of Limitations: Legal doctrines set the stage and the stopwatch, determining where battles unfold and how quickly the fight begins, which might put plaintiffs at a disadvantage based on jurisdiction and preparation.[91]
The Price of Legal Actions and “Loser Pays”: Many prospective plaintiffs are discouraged, especially those with limited finances, by the high expenses of litigation and likelihood of having to pay the defendant’s legal fees if the case is lost.[92]
Practical Obstacles in Evidentiary Matters: Gathering sufficient evidence against multinational corporations is a tall task, enmeshed in intricate business practices, cross-border discovery hurdles, and threats faced by witnesses who risk retaliation.[93] Discovery may offer a path, but unlocking that door is no small feat, demanding precision and persistence amid laws that often clash in scope and scheme.[94]
Collective Redress and Class Action Mechanisms: Rulings like Wal-Mart v. Dukes have weakened the effectiveness of class actions in human rights cases, while the absence of comparable procedures in Europe is a major barrier.[95]
Amid growing scrutiny of global supply chains, Doe 1 v. Apple appealed in December 2022.[96] Plaintiffs accused intermediaries like Glencore, Zhejiang Huayou Cobalt Company, and the Eurasian Resources Group of diluting and obscuring forced labor products with ethically sourced materials.[97] This alleged tactic funneled through suppliers like Umicore, shielded tech giants from direct liability, despite purported awareness of exploitation.[98] However, the victims’ “case or controversy” hinged on the TVPRA and how these tech giants’ “participation in a venture” in the international cobalt supply chain intentionally exacerbated the exploitation, not just obtaining an unknown amount of cobalt as part of the global supply network.[99]
Under Rule 12(b)(6), the Plaintiffs’ case underwent rigorous scrutiny, with the terms “participation” and “venture” dissected to their principles.[100] While the Plaintiffs painted a vivid picture of corporations as covert orchestrators sustaining forced labor, proving this claim is a minefield, since the supply chain may reflect standard commercial dealings lacking a “tacit agreement.”[101] In essence, the Plaintiffs’ argument faltered under speculation, attempting to distinguish shared risks and profits without tangible evidence—likely unattainable due to opacity and numerous intermediaries.[102]
Furthermore, under Article III of the U.S. Constitution, courts hear disputes involving real adversaries, not hypothetical scenarios and questions.[103] Plaintiffs must show (1) a valid claim for damages, (2) a direct link to the defendant’s actions, and (3) a plausible fix through a court ruling.[104] Here, the court found no clear remedy, rendering Plaintiffs’ claims—unjust enrichment, negligent supervision, emotional distress, and injunctive relief—null under insufficient proof.[105]
V. Cobalt’s Chessboard of Moral Mines: The Game of Gain and Governance
The pursuit of ethical cobalt in the DRC is entangled in a web of contingencies that challenge success for all stakeholders. For example, even with innovations like cobalt-free batteries[106] or Apple pledging to rely solely on recycled cobalt in Apple-designed batteries,[107] a corporate exodus risks exacerbating its struggles by ceding control to China in the cobalt tug-of-war.[108]
Should Apple and other businesses shoulder blame for a sovereign state’s sins? What if that territory controls vital resources to nations and businesses alike, where a hostile rival exploits the same system without restraint? With international initiatives, like the United Nations Guiding Principles on Business and Human Rights,[109] OECD Guidance on due diligence in mineral supply chains,[110] and “Cobalt for Development,”[111] too weak to hold anyone accountable, where does responsibility lie? On corporations? On consumers, whose demand fuels the cycle? It’s easy to get lost in the semantics of a complicated system of contingencies.
The stakes transcend borders and boardrooms, as the path forward demands a collaborative effort between governments, businesses, consumers, and advocacy organizations—not in token gestures, but through diplomacy, targeted intervention, and strategic invention. Apple’s own commitment underscores a leap from paper to practice as solutions reconcile profit with purpose: “Although [we do] not directly purchase, procure, or source primary minerals, [we] are committed to meeting and exceeding internationally-accepted due diligence standards … in our supply chain.”[112] Opponents might argue that the black ink on a financial ledger cannot mix with the emotional concerns of a people’s suffering; however, aligning ethical values with economic value can drive profit to meet purpose—cutting costs, securing market exclusivity, ensuring compliance, and winning over ethical consumers.[113]
VI. Conclusion — Weighing Wills and Ways Forward for Ethical Cobalt
Investing in the DRC is not just ethical—it’s strategically sound. A recent EU agreement was reached by legislators of Parliament and Council, that prohibits businesses of all sizes from distributing goods within the area that were manufactured using forced labor,[114] which can impact Apple’s 24% share of the EU smartphone market.[115] If the toll of compliance seems steep, the fines for failure may be far steeper.[116] Beyond being home to the world’s largest cobalt reserves, the DRC also boasts vast natural wealth: timber, oil, diamonds, copper,[117] hydropower potential, arable land, immense biodiversity, and the planet’s second-largest rainforest.[118] These resources, alongside billions of humanitarian and bilateral aid,[119] represent untapped opportunities for transforming cobalt’s legacy from a scar of exploitation in the DRC to a spark of innovation globally.
[1] Bruno Venditti, Ranked: The World’s Top Cobalt Producing Countries, VISUAL CAPITALIST (July 24, 2023), www.visualcapitalist.com/ranked-the-worlds-top-cobalt-producing-countries.
[2] Cobalt Institute, Why Is Cobalt Important, www.cobaltinstitute.org/essential-cobalt-2/#:~:text=Cobalt%20is%20used%20in%20the,conductors%20in%20computers%20and%20phones (accessed Feb. 24, 2024).
[3] Id.
[4] Venditti, supra note 1.
[5] Apple Inc., United States Securities and Exchange Commission FORM SD Specialized Disclosure Report, APPLE INC. (Feb. 2023), https://www.apple.com/euro/supplier-responsibility/l/generic/pdf/Apple-Conflict-Minerals-Report.pdf [https://perma.cc/G8LC-79EJ].
[6] Leigh Day, Cobalt Mining in the Democratic Republic of Congo: Where Next?, LEXOLOGY (June 22, 2023), www.lexology.com/library/detail.aspx?g=2deb7a71-3439-402e-8afd-5ba917931367#:~:text=Holding%20the%20tech%20giants%20to%20account%20%2D%20Doe%20v%20Apple&text=The%20Plaintiffs%20sought%20compensation%20for,Protection%20Reauthorization%20Act%20(TVPRA) [https://perma.cc/PJ3M-Q7DQ].
[7] Id.
[8] Patricia Ndagano, No, Cobalt Is Not a Conflict Mineral, African Arguments (May 5, 2020), africanarguments.org/2020/05/no-cobalt-is-not-a-conflict-mineral/#:~:text=Conflict%20minerals%20refer%20to%20a,groups%20in%20the%20eastern%20DRC [https://perma.cc/QW6A-4EE9]. The Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act of 2010 represents a legislative response to the complexities of financial ethics, transparency, and global human rights. Born from the ashes of the 2008 financial crisis, this expansive statute not only reshaped financial regulation to shield American consumers from market excesses but also sought accountability for corporations benefiting from minerals that finance violent conflict in Central Africa. Notably, Section 1502 compels companies to meticulously trace and publicly disclose the origins of four key conflict minerals—tin, tantalum, tungsten, and gold—derived from the Democratic Republic of the Congo and its neighboring countries. By linking corporate transparency directly to humanitarian outcomes, the Act aims to sever financial lifelines that sustain armed groups perpetrating severe human rights abuses and destabilizing a geopolitically sensitive region;
United States Government Accountability Office, Conflict Minerals: 2022 Company Reports on Mineral Sources Were Similar to Those Filed in Prior Years, GAO-23-106295 (July 2023), www.gao.gov/assets/gao-23-106295.pdf.
[9] Id.
[10] See Siddharth Kara, Cobalt Red: How the Blood of the Congo Powers Our Lives (2023).
[11] Id.
[12] Terry Gross, How ‘Modern-Day Slavery’ in the Congo Powers the Rechargeable Battery Economy, NPR (Feb. 1, 2023, 12:38 PM), https://www.npr.org/sections/goatsandsoda/2023/02/01/1152893248/red-cobalt-congo-drc-mining-siddharth-kara [https://perma.cc/8BUW-XUNH]
[13] Valentina Ruiz Leotaud, Families in the DRC Increasingly Rely on Children Working in Cobalt Mines — Report, MINING.COM (July 16, 2023, 8.29 AM), [https://perma.cc/WV4M-T96D].
[14] Supra note 13.
[15] Amnesty Int’l, “This Is What We Die for”: Human Rights Abuses n The Democratic Republic of the Congo Power the Global Trade in Cobalt at 33, 37 (2016), www.amnesty.org/en/wp-content/uploads/2021/05/AFR6231832016ENGLISH.pdf [https://perma.cc/A8CV-H4RP].
[16] Id.
[17] Id. at 5, 22, 29.
[18] Id. at 32.
[19] ‘Cobalt Red’: Smartphones and Electric Cars Rely on Toxic Mineral Mined in Congo by Children, Democracy Now! (July 13, 2023), www.democracynow.org/2023/7/13/cobalt_red_kara.
[20] Id.
[21] World Health Organization, Democratic Republic of the Congo Faces Acute Health Crisis Amid Rising Violence, (June 23, 2023), www.afro.who.int/countries/democratic-republic-congo/news/democratic-republic-congo-faces-acute-health-crisis-amid-rising-violence [https://perma.cc/AFF2-QWRX].
[22] Id.
[23] The Conversation, ‘We Miners Die a Lot’: The Appalling Conditions and Poverty Wages of Congo Cobalt Miners, Fast Company (Feb. 4, 2024), www.fastcompany.com/91021938/we-miners-die-a-lot-the-appalling-conditions-and-poverty-wages-of-congo-cobalt-miners [https://perma.cc/5VKR-9A6K].
[24] Democracy Now!, supra note 21.
[25] Five Key Issues at Stake in the DR Congo’s Crucial Election, Al Jazeera (Dec. 11, 2023), www.aljazeera.com/news/2023/12/11/five-key-issues-at-stake-in-the-dr-congos-crucial-election [https://perma.cc/DG2F-C7KA].
[26] Democratic Republic of the Congo, Global Centre for the Responsibility to Protect (July 15, 2025), www.globalr2p.org/countries/democratic-republic-of-the-congo [https://perma.cc/3BAR-DWPK].
[27] Democracy Now!, supra note 21.
[28] Kara, supra note 12.
[29] Sarah Carter, U.S. Helps Negotiate Cease-fire for Congo Election as World Powers Vie for Access to Its Vital Cobalt, CBS NEWS (Dec. 19, 2023), https://www.cbsnews.com/news/congo-cease-fire-election-cobalt-mining/ [https://perma.cc/35V7-SBL7].
[30] Id.
[31] Democratic Republic of the Congo – Market Overview, Int’l Trade | TRADE.GOV (Dec. 14, 2022), https://www.trade.gov/country-commercial-guides/democratic-republic-congo-market-overview [https://perma.cc/D79A-LG6H].
[32] Id.
[33] Kara, Supra note 30.
[34] Al Jazeera, Supra note 27.
[35] Global Centre for the Responsibility to Protect, supra note 28.
[36] Democratic Republic of the Congo: Industrial Mining of Cobalt and Copper for Rechargeable Batteries Is Leading to Grievous Human Rights Abuses, Amnesty Int’l(Sept. 12, 2023), https://www.amnesty.org/en/latest/news/2023/09/drc-cobalt-and-copper-mining-for-batteries-leading-to-human-rights-abuses/ [https://perma.cc/36FN-YNEX].
[37] Amnesty Int’l, supra note 38. (Chemaf is a leading producer of battery-grade copper and cobalt, operating high-capacity, ISO-certified plants at the core of Africa’s mineral-rich zones. With flagship assets and next-gen processing underway, it’s rapidly becoming a cornerstone of the world’s sustainable future.); See Chemaf, Our Business, https://chemaf.com/our-business/ [https://perma.cc/36FN-YNEX] (last visited Apr. 7, 2025).
[38] Amnesty Int’l, supra note 38.
[39] Id.
[40] Andrew L. Gulley, One Hundred Years of Cobalt Production in the Democratic Republic of the Congo, 79 Resources Policy Article 103007 (2022), https://doi.org/10.1016/j.resourpol.2022.103007.
[41] Id. at 7.
[42] Id.
[43] Id.
[44] Human Rights Watch, DR Congo: Mine Workers at Risk During Covid-19, (June 11, 2020), www.hrw.org/news/2020/06/11/dr-congo-mine-workers-risk-during-covid-19?gad_source=1&gclid=CjwKCAiAq4KuBhA6EiwArMAw1Fn8CJ302_2tYfMAiJYfFTmXbWnbX0Kg3yzm-bpFKCRUvr345KtNLxoCEZ4QAvD_BwE [https://perma.cc/9FKC-ZDAC].
[45] Supra note 41.
[46] Melissa Skorka, To Counter China, Look to the Democratic Republic of Congo, Wall St. J. (Apr. 27, 2023, 6:43 PM ET), https://www.wsj.com/business/to-counter-china-look-to-the-democratic-republic-of-congo-cobalt-rare-earth-9191253a?mod=Searchresults&pos=1&page=1.
[47] Sean Carberry, Critical Mineral: United States Seeking Alternatives to Chinese Cobalt, 107 National Defense 28, 28 (Aug. 2022).
[48] Id.
[49] South China Morning Post, Chinese Firms Agree to Raise Investment in Democratic Republic of Congo Copper-cobalt Mining Deal, Yahoo! Finance (Feb. 4, 2024), finance.yahoo.com/news/chinese-firms-agree-raise-investment-093000661.html.
[50] Gracelin Baskaran, A Window of Opportunity to Build Critical Mineral Security in Africa, CSIS (Oct. 10, 2023), www.csis.org/analysis/window-opportunity-build-critical-mineral-security-africa [https://perma.cc/F9WR-NMLD].
[51] Id.
[52] South China Morning Post, supra note 51.
[53] David Thomas, Workers Report ‘Colonial-era’ Abuse at Congolese Cobalt Mines, African Business (Nov. 9, 2021), african.business/2021/11/energy-resources/workers-report-colonial-era-abuse-at-congolese-cobalt-mines [https://perma.cc/5BE3-XWAZ].
[54] Congressional-Executive Commission on China, From Cobalt to Cars: How China Exploits Child and Forced Labor, YouTube (Nov. 14, 2023), www.youtube.com/watch?v=oSXo4dPpRQ8.
[55] Supra note 52.
[56] Franchesca Viernes, Oversupply, Low Prices for Cobalt to Persist in 2024 as Demand Slips, S&P Global Commodity Insights (Dec. 27, 2023), www.spglobal.com/commodityinsights/en/market-insights/latest-news/metals/122723-oversupply-low-prices-for-cobalt-to-persist-in-2024-as-demand-slips.
[57] Pratima Desai, Cobalt Supplies to Swamp Market, Pressure Prices Further, Reuters (Mar. 7, 2023), www.reuters.com/markets/commodities/cobalt-supplies-swamp-market-pressure-prices-further-2023-03-07/#:~:text=Global%20supplies%20of%20refined%20cobalt,rise%208%25%20to%20205%2C000%20tonnes [https://perma.cc/4XLX-J4NL].
[58] Australia Looks to Boost Domestic Mineral Processing Industry With $676 Million Fund, Benchmark Minerals (June 21, 2023), source.benchmarkminerals.com/article/australia-looks-to-boost-domestic-mineral-processing-industry-with-676-million-fund.
[59] Supra note 13.
[60] See Carlos Moncayo, The Economic Benefits and Best Practices of Ethical Sourcing, Forbes (Apr. 4, 2023, 8:30am), www.forbes.com/councils/forbesbusinesscouncil/2023/04/04/the-economic-benefits-and-best-practices-of-ethical-sourcing/ [https://perma.cc/R6M5-WWYG]
[61] See Beyond Dependence: The Power of Supply Chain Diversification, Exiger (Sept. 4, 2024), https://www.exiger.com/perspectives/beyond-dependence-the-power-of-supply-chain-diversification/ [https://perma.cc/X4X4-F6SY].
[62] Josh Wilson, Entertainment Industry Becomes More Vocal About the Cobalt Situation in the Congo, Forbes (Mar. 15, 2023, 8:07 AM), www.forbes.com/sites/joshwilson/2023/03/15/entertainment-industry-becomes-more-vocal-about-the-cobalt-situation-in-the-congo/?sh=2b7eabbbddf3 [https://perma.cc/LJ4K-4H5D].
[63] Id.
[64] Stephanie Kaloi, Apple’s Tim Cook Tells Dua Lipa ‘We Can’ Guarantee Children Aren’t Mining iPhone 15’s Cobalt, The Wrap (Nov. 18, 2023), www.thewrap.com/apple-iphone-cobalt-tim-cook-dua-lipa-children-miners-labor.
[65] Luisa Gatward, Shopping Habits Are Changing, What Will It Be Like in 2030?, The Giving Machine (Aug. 10, 2023), www.thegivingmachine.co.uk/blog/posts/how-our-shopping-habits-are-changing/#:~:text=The%20shopping%20habits%20of%20consumers,more%20selective%20in%20their%20spending [https://perma.cc/R9NY-EVFJ].
[66] Derek Pankratz et al., The Cost of Buying Green, Deloitte Insights (June 17, 2022), www.deloitte.com/us/en/insights/industry/retail-distribution/consumer-behavior-trends-state-of-the-consumer-tracker/sustainable-products-and-practices-for-green-living.html [https://perma.cc/L8G5-2FTY].
[67] Mary Louise Kelly et al., The U.S. Supports China’s Growth if It ‘Plays by the Rules,’ Commerce Secretary Says, NPR (Dec. 5, 2023, 5:00am), www.npr.org/2023/12/05/1217040572/the-u-s-supports-chinas-growth-if-it-plays-by-the-rules-commerce-secretary-says [https://perma.cc/WG69-JKTN].
[68] Daniel Quiggin & Richard King, Cobalt Refining Power Gives China an Advantage in the Race for EV Battery Dominance, Resource Trade Earth (July 4, 2023), resourcetrade.earth/publications/critical-metals-ev-batteries [https://perma.cc/APF4-SZ7U].
[69] Gert Van Calster, A Quick (Jurisdictional) Note on the Cobalt Supply Chain Litigation, Gavc Law(Nov. 2, 2020), gavclaw.com/2020/02/11/a-quick-jurisdictional-note-on-the-cobalt-supply-chain-litigation[https://perma.cc/6Y6A-JQD7].
[70] William S. Dodge, Oral Argument in Doe v. Apple, Transnational Litigation Blog (Dec. 13, 2022), tlblog.org/oral-argument-in-doe-v-apple [https://perma.cc/NJE4-XCUW].
[71] Supra note 10.
[72] Id.
[73] Amar Toor, Apple and Samsung Suppliers Linked to Child Labor in Africa, Report Says, The Verge (Jan. 18, 2016, 6:01 PM), www.theverge.com/2016/1/18/10786714/apple-samsung-child-labor-cobalt-congo-amnesty [https://perma.cc/LQ78-RQF2].
[74] Doe I v. Apple Inc., No. 1:19-CV-03737 (CJN), 2021 WL 5774224 (D.D.C. Nov. 2, 2021), aff’d sub nom. Doe 1 v. Apple Inc., No. 21-7135, 2024 WL 925889 (D.C. Cir. Mar. 5, 2024).
[75] Id.
[76] Id.
[77] Maria Piontkovska & Doriane Nguenang, US Court Dismissed Cobalt Mining Forced Labor Lawsuit Against Tech Companies – Global Supply Chain Compliance, Global Supply Chain Compliance (Nov. 18, 2021), supplychaincompliance.bakermckenzie.com/2021/11/18/us-court-dismissed-cobalt-mining-forced-labor-lawsuit-against-tech-companies [https://perma.cc/Y7FD-YVXT].
[78] Supra note 71.
[79] Id.
[80] Id.
[81] Id.
[82] Alien Tort Statute, 28 U.S.C. § 1350 (2018).
[83] Tara McGrath, Kiobel v. Royal Dutch Petroleum: Delineating the Bounds of the Alien Tort Statute, 8 Duke J. Const. L. & Pub. Pol‘y Sidebar (2012).
[84] Kiobel v. Royal Dutch Petroleum Co., 569 U.S. 108, 124–25 (2013).
[85] Nestlé USA, Inc. v. Doe, 141 S. Ct. 1931, 1936–37 (2021); Stephen P. Mulligan, Cong. Rsch. Serv., R44947, The Alien Tort Statute: A Primer 13, 20 (Jan. 11, 2022); Gwynne L. Skinner, Beyond Kiobel: Providing Access to Judicial Remedies for Violations of International Human Rights Norms by Transnational Business in a New (Post-Kiobel) World, 46 Colum. Hum. Rts. L. Rev. 158, 162 (2014).
[86] Id.
[87] Joseph N. Sotile, Forum Non Conveniens and Corruption: A Lofty Hurdle or a Solid Barrier to Justice?, Colum. J. Transnat’l L. (2023), www.jtl.columbia.edu/bulletin-blog/forum-non-conveniens-and-corruption-a-lofty-hurdle-or-a-solid-barrier-to-justice [https://perma.cc/87RL-7WCE].
[88] Daimler AG v. Bauman, 134 S. Ct. 746, 760 (2014).
[89] Jindan-Karena Mann, Tech Company Liability in the Context of the Cobalt Supply Chain, Rethinking SLIC (Dec. 23, 2020), www.rethinkingslic.org/blog/tort-law/78-tech-company-liability-in-the-context-of-the-cobalt-supply-chain [https://perma.cc/H2QD-BW92].
[90] Id.
[91] McGrath, supra note 85.
[92] Mann, supra note 89.
[93] Id.
[94] Alvaro Cuervo-Cazurra et al., Multinationals’ Misbehavior, 56 J. World Bus.101244, 17 (2021).
[95] Timothy D. Edwards, Class Action Suits After Walmart v. Dukes, 84 Wis. Law. (Nov. 2011).
[96] Doe 1 v. Apple Inc., 96 F.4th 403 (D.C. Cir. 2024).
[97] Id. at 407.
[98] Id. at 406–07.
[99] Id.
[100] Id. at 414–16.
[101] Id. at 416.
[102] Id. at 414.
[103] Id. at 408.
[104] Id. at 405.
[105] Id. at 416–17.
[106] Supra note 62.
[107] Press Release, Apple, Apple Will Use 100 Percent Recycled Cobalt in Batteries by 2025 (Apr. 13, 2023), www.apple.com/newsroom/2023/04/apple-will-use-100-percent-recycled-cobalt-in-batteries-by-2025 [https://perma.cc/2QDW-PBJW].
[108] Stéphanie Thomson, 4 Companies Helping Rebuild Conflict-Ridden Countries, World Economic Forum (May 6, 2016), www.weforum.org/stories/2016/05/4-companies-helping-rebuild-conflict-ridden-countries/ [https://perma.cc/4D6V-VT7K].
[109] U.N. Hum. Rts. Off. of the High Comm’r, Guiding Principles on Business and Human Rights: Implementing the United Nations ‘Protect, Respect and Remedy’ Framework, U.N. Doc. HR/PUB/11/04 (June 16, 2011), www.ohchr.org/sites/default/files/documents/publications/guidingprinciplesbusinesshr_en.pdf [https://perma.cc/U7WQ-QL52].
[110] Supra note 37.
[111] Cross-industry Partnership to Enhance Sustainable Cobalt Mining, BASF, https://www.basf.com/global/en/who-we-are/sustainability/we-source-responsibly/cobalt-initiative.html (last visited Feb. 24, 2024) [https://perma.cc/SZ74-7NJ8].
[112] Adams, supra note 7.
[113] Moncayo, supra note 62.
[114] EU Reaches Provisional Agreement on Banning Products Made With Forced Labour, Cooley (Mar. 13, 2024), https://www.cooley.com/news/insight/2024/2024-03-13-eu-reaches-provisional-agreement-on-banning-products-made-with-forced-labour [https://perma.cc/7PW3-2CBB].
[115] Federica Laricchia, Apple’s Share of Smartphone Shipments in Europe 2019-2023, Statista (Jan. 31, 2024), www.statista.com/statistics/1232268/apple-smartphone-market-share-in-europe.
[116] William M. Sullivan Jr. & Fabio Leonardi, Prosecuting Corporations That Benefit Financially from Human Trafficking, Pillsbury (July 24, 2019), https://www.pillsburylaw.com/en/news-and-insights/prosecuting-corporations-that-benefit-financially-from-human-trafficking.html [https://perma.cc/P9NM-DCL8].
[117] UN Environment Programme, Can the Democratic Republic of the Congo’s Mineral Resources Provide a Pathway to Peace?, UNEP (Sept. 20, 2022), https://www.unep.org/news-and-stories/story/can-democratic-republic-congos-mineral-resources-provide-pathway-peace.
[118] The World Bank in DRC, World Bank (Sept. 25, 2023), https://www.worldbank.org/en/country/drc/overview#:~:text=DRC%20is%20endowed%20with%20exceptional,not%20benefited%20from%20this%20wealth [https://perma.cc/C6FD-RWGQ].
[119] U.S. Embassy Kinshasa, What the United States Is Doing in the DRC, U.S. Embassy (Mar. 4, 2024), cd.usembassy.gov/what-the-united-states-is-doing-in-the-drc [insert permalink].